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NOTES
NARENJI V CIVILETTI: EQUAL PROTECTION
AND THE IRANIAN CRISIS
Under present standards of constitutional analysis, governmental classifications which make distinctions or discriminate on the basis of national
origin are suspect in nature and, as such, are subject to the strict standard
of judicial review imposed by the equal protection guarantees of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments.' Since The Japanese Restriction Cases,2 the
1. Prior to 1938, the Supreme Court upheld discriminatory classifications against equal
protection challenges if they met the criteria of minimum rationality. See, e.g., Louisville
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412 (1920); Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910); Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v.
Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897). When reviewing socioeconomic regulations, the Court determined
that government restrictions treating persons differently need only have a reasonable and
nonarbitrary basis in order to survive judicial review. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). Under the standard of minimum rationality, a discriminatory
classification will be invalidated only if it rests "on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective" or if it is unsupported by "any state of facts [that] reasonably
may be conceived.to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
A second level of equal protection analysis emerged in 1938 when the Supreme Court first
acknowledged, in United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), that discrimination against "discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id at 152-53 n.4, This heightened level of review, termed "strict scrutiny," is triggered whenever discrimination is directed against a "suspect" class or when fundamental
rights are abridged. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). Cases decided since the "suspect class" theory was first
articulated in Korematsu, see notes 45-53 and accompanying text infra, have further defined
the criteria that characterize a suspect class. In addition to the factor of political underrepresentation, the Court looks carefully at classifications which are based on "an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth," Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 686 (1973), or which affect groups that have been "subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1,28 (1973). In order that a suspect classification withstand review under the strict scrutiny
standard, the government must make a dual showing. First, a compelling state interest or
purpose must exist. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948). Second, the use of the classification must be necessary to the
accomplishment of the state interest. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Since most classifications fail to survive the two-pronged
strict scrutiny test, Professor Gunther has labeled the approach "strict in theory and fatal in
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application of a strict scrutiny test to national origin discrimination 3 has
become a fundamental tenet of equal protection theory, frequently serving
as a constitutional shield for the protection of politically unpopular minorities in times of public unrest. Nevertheless, in the midst of the recent
Iranian crisis, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a discriminatory law directed at a political minority
of specific national origin under a minimum rationality standard of
4
review.
Narenji v. Civiletti' involved an equal protection challenge to a regulation promulgated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in
response to a directive issued by President Carter following the seizure of
the American hostages in Tehran in November, 1979. The INS regulation
directed all Iranian nonimmigrant students in the United States to report
to the Immigration and Naturalization Service in order to verify compliance with the terms of their immigration status. Failure to do so would
result in the risk of deportation.6 A consolidated class action was brought
fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term--Foreword." In Search f Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court. A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,8 (1972).
Recently, the Supreme Court has indicated that a third level of review, "middle scrutiny,"
may be applicable to equal protection challenges when the rights affected are important in
nature but not deemed fundamental, or when sensitive, though not suspect, criteria are used
as a basis for a discriminatory classification. Intermediate review utilizes a number of judicial techniques to invalidate a challenged restriction, although generally this standard involves a sliding scale of review corresponding to the gravity of the discrimination. See
generally San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943).
3. It should be noted that the distinction between race and national origin has largely
disappeared in the equal protection doctrine. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1052 n.3 (1978). Professor Tribe states: "The Supreme Court has assimilated discrimination based on specific national origin to racial or ancestral determination." Id See also 1I
T. EMERSON, D. HABER, & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 84 (4th ed. 1979). For purposes of this note, the terms "national origin" and "ancestry" will be used interchangeably.
4. Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rehearing en banc denied, 617
F.2d 750, cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
5. Id
6. 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1981). As originally promulgated by Attorney General Benjamin
Civiletti, the reporting requirement read as follows:
On November 10, 1979, the President ordered the Attorney General to identify
Iranian students in the United States who are not maintaining status and to take
immediate steps to commence deportation proceedings against such persons. The
Attorney General directed the Immigration and Naturalization Service to issue
regulations requiring all nonimmigrant Iranian students to report their present lo-

cation and status promptly to the nearest INS office and to take additional actions
to identify and locate all Iranian students to determine their immigration status. In
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in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by several
Iranian nonimmigrant students which, inter alia,7 challenged the INS regulation on equal protection grounds.'
District Court Judge Joyce Hens Green invalidated the regulation as
"an impermissible distinction made on the basis of national origin which
violated the fifth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the law." 9
compliance with the President's directive, the regulations governing maintenance
of status by nonimmigrant students will be amended to require Iranian students in
the United States to report within 30 days to the nearest INS office or to an INS
representative on campus and to present certain information verifying location and
status as a student. Failure to report as required or provision of false information
to the INS will subject a student to deportation proceedings for failure to comply
with the conditions of nonimmigrant status. Conviction of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year will constitute failure to maintain status.
These regulations are issued under the authority vested in the Attorney General by
Sect. 214 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1184 (a). Effective
Date: November 13, 1979.
44 Fed. Reg. 65,727-28 (1979) (codified in 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1981)).
7. Plaintiffs also raised other constitutional and statutory arguments contending that
the regulation constituted an illegal seizure under the fourth amendment and that the first
amendment rights of speech, assembly, and association of both Iranian students and American citizens were infringed by 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1981). In addition, they argued that the
regulation violated international law and that the defendants had failed to comply with the
notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. Narenji v. Civiletti,
481 F. Supp. at 1136-37.
8. There has been some dispute in the past over whether the equal protection component of the fifth amendment due process clause compels the same guarantees as the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968) (only invidious discrimination is barred by fifth
amendment due process clause); accord, Taylor v. United States, 320 F.2d 843 (9th Cir.
1963); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati, 329 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements indicate that the equal protection guarantees of the two amendments are now considered coextensive. In Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954), the Court held racial segregation in the District of Columbia public school
system violative of the fifth amendment and stated that "the concepts of equal protection
and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. . . . [D]iscrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Id
at 499 n.2 (citing Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943); Currin v. Wallace, 306
U.S. 1, 13-14 (1948); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1936)). Later decisions
further clarified the scope of the fifth amendment equal protection guarantee. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) ("This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment," citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973)). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection analysis in
the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment," quoting
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)); accord, Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub non Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
9. 481 F. Supp. at 1145. Judge Green first addressed the plaintiffs' nonconstitutional
arguments and found that the defendant's failure to comply with the notice and comment
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Although she acknowledged that the well-established plenary power of
Congress over matters relating to immigration and naturalization could be
delegated to the executive, 0 Judge Green held that the broad powers conprovisions of the Administrative Procedure Act was permissible under the circumstances
since compliance would have resulted in a delay in the regulation's implementation, weakening its effect in such a manner as to be "impracticable and contrary to the public interest."
Id at 1137. The district court also determined that the specific provisions of 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.5 (1981) requiring students to produce passports and related documents as part of the
reporting procedure were within the powers delegated to the executive branch by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a) (1976). 481 F. Supp.
at 1137-38. The court then invalidated the regulation on equal protection grounds and did
not reach plaintiff's first amendment argument, which alleged that the purpose of the regulation was to chill the exercise of the rights of Iranian students to speech, association and
assembly. Nor did the court find it necessary to address the argument that 8 C.F.R. § 214.5
(1981) was a "compelled interrogation" and thus constituted an illegal seizure in violation of
the fourth amendment.
10. 481 F. Supp. at 1139. The plenary power doctrine states that Congress has exclusive
control over the entry, exclusion and regulation of aliens in this country by virtue of both the
express power delegated to it by the Constitution and the extra-constitutional powers inherent in national sovereignty. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 of the United States Constitution delegates to
Congress the power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization ... throughout the
United States." The theory that the federal power over immigration, which is vested in the
political branches, has an extra-constitutional source is predicated on the sovereign right of
every nation to regulate the passage of noncitizens over its borders. In Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), the Court summarized the national sovereignty argument, stating: "It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe." Id. at 659.
Because of the close relationship between immigration matters and foreign affairs, courts
hesitate to second-guess the decisions of the legislative and executive branches concerning
matters which these political bodies are considered better equipped to resolve. In Mathews
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), the Supreme Court elaborated on this aspect of the plenary
power doctrine:
For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the
political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions in these matters
may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the
Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary.
Id at 81-82. The plenary power doctrine has been relied upon in a numb~er of decisions
involving federal restrictions on noncitizens but has its strongest support in those cases involving anticommunist legislation. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). For an excellent
discussion urging abandonment of the plenary power doctrine in immigration cases, see
Comment, Aliens, Deportationand the Equal Protection Clause: A Critical Reappraisal,6
GOLDEN GATE UNIv. L. REV. 23 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Aliens, Deportation]. The author argues that further reliance on the plenary power is unjustifiable for the following reasons: (a) the concept of an unrestrained federal power conflicts with the constitutional model
of restraint, id at 25-26; (b) in the balance of powers equation, even the foreign affairs power
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ferred by Congress on the Attorney General to establish conditions for the
entry of aliens into the United States did not include "explicit authority to
discriminate among aliens on the basis of national origin."'" The court
rejected the government's argument that the President's constitutional
power to regulate foreign affairs gave the executive branch authority over
immigration matters concurrent with that of Congress and thus exempted
actions taken by the executive in that area from judicial review.' 2 Judge
Green noted that "above all, it is patent that the executive, even in the area
of immigration and naturalization, must be subject to applicable principles
of the Constitution."' 3 After evaluating the action of the executive in light
of the familiar balance of powers analysis set forth by Justice Jackson in
his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 4 the
court concluded that review of the regulation at issue in Narenji was appropriate because, in the absence of congressional authorization, the issuance of the regulation "exceeds the proper boundaries within which the
three branches of our constitutional government co-exist."' 5 The district
court then went on to review the equal protection question under the "legitimate basis" standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong.16 Examining the national interests offered by the government as justification for the challenged regulation,'" the court determined
is subject to judicial review, id at 36-37; (c) since immigration laws often affect the fundamental or sensitive rights of aliens, there is a corresponding need for a greater degree of
constitutional protection, id at 67-77; and (d) the plenary power theory conflicts with modem techniques of constitutional analysis because it leaves no room for a balancing of competing interests, id at 63-64, 77.
11. 481 F. Supp. at 1141.
12. Id
13. Id at 1143.
14. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Under the balance of powers theory, if the President acts in
response to congressional authorization, his exercise of power has a strong presumption of
validity and receives "the widest latitude of judicial interpretation." Id at 637 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). If the President lacks either a congressional endorsement or denial of authority, however, he exercises the challenged action in "a zone of twilight," and any review by
the courts must look to "the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather
than ... abstract theories of law." Id Measures taken in direct opposition to the expressed
will of Congress must be carefully examined by the judicial branch since, at this point, the
President acts when "his power is at its lowest ebb." Id
15. 481 F. Supp. at 1143.
16. 426 U.S. 88 (1976). See notes 84-88 and accompanying text infra.
17. The government's interest in retaliating against Iran was dismissed by the court as
noncompelling, especially where other political and economic actions could be taken that
would not violate individual rights. Characterizing the government's actions as a "discriminatory thirty-day roundup that violates the fundamental principles of American fairness,"
481 F. Supp. at 1144, the court found that "census taking", the second justification offered
by the government, was for administrative convenience only and could not be justified as an
"overriding" governmental interest. Id
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that only protection of the hostages could be labeled "overriding."' 18 That
justification failed, however, because there was at best only a "dubious"
relationship between the protection of the hostages and the presence of
Iranian students in this country. 19
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the INS regulation was a valid exercise of the authority delegated to the Attorney General under the
Immigration and Nationality Act.2 0 Judge Robb, writing for the court,
concluded that the actions of the Attorney General taken pursuant to his
broad authority to administer the immigration laws need not be specifically delegated by statute but only reasonably related to his duties under
the Act. In contrast to the intermediate standard of review utilized by the
lower court, the court of appeals examined the regulation in Narenji under
the less demanding standard of minimal rationality.2 ' Despite the suspect
nature of national origin discrimination, the court found such distinctions
permissible when made by Congress or the executive 2 in the field of immigration as long as they are not "wholly irrational." 23 In the opinion of
the court of appeals, the district court had overstepped its role and should
have declined to review a judgment made by the President in the field of
foreign policy, especially when that judgment also involved the congressional power over immigration and naturalization.2 4
Narenji v. Civiletzi illustrates the problematic nature of equal protection
cases where a discriminatory law directed at a particular class (aliens) also
discriminates within that class on a suspect basis (national origin). 25 Such
18. Id

19. Id Judge Green went on to state that: "[Tihis undeniably tenuous cause and effect
relationship between this inherently discriminatory regulation and the unpredictable emotional reaction it is to temper, based as it must be on speculation, utterly fails to demonstrate
that the regulation indeed serves the national interest in protecting the hostages." Id at
1145.
20. 617 F.2d 745, 747. The court found that the issuance of the regulation was within

the scope of 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1976) which charges the Attorney General with the "administration and enforcement of this Act and all other laws relating to the immigration and
naturalization of aliens," and was also within 8 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(9) (1976) which grants the
Attorney General the power to deport aliens who are out of compliance with the terms of
their immigration status.
21. 617 F.2d at 748.
22. Id at 747.

23. Id
24. Id at 748.

25. One commentator has explained:

[In] such cases aliens as a group are not the objects of discrimination. Rather natu-

ralization and deportation laws necessarily discriminate among aliens on the basis
of other, presumably nonsuspect, criteria. This situation, discrimination within
rather than against an arguably suspect group, is unique, since in other contexts the
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a situation is further complicated when such actions are taken in the politically sensitive areas of foreign affairs and immigration under the rubric of
the congressional plenary power over aliens. The threshold characterization of a governmental distinction as one that affects either a fundamental
right or a suspect class triggers the strict scrutiny standard, a result that is
largely outcome-determinative.2 6 Under the prevailing standards of equal
protection, discriminatory classifications which abridge fundamental rights
or affect a suspect characteristic such as race or national origin have traditionally received a higher degree of judicial scrutiny 7 than classifications
which discriminate on the basis of alien status. In contrast, federal alienage classifications will generally be sustained by the courts under the minimum rationality standard, in deference to the congressional plenary power
over matters in the immigration area.28
This note will trace the historical development of the existing equal protection standards in both alienage and national origin cases and will further examine the Narenji decision in light of those standards. It will be
demonstrated that the deviation in Narenji from established standards of
review cannot be justified either by previous decisions of the Supreme
Court or the congressional power over immigration and naturalization. In
conclusion, it will be argued that adherence to basic constitutional principles is especially warranted in politically volatile situations where public
antagonism threatens the rights of a powerless minority.
I.

ALIENS IN THE MELTING POT:

A

TRADITION OF DISCRIMINATION

Historically, aliens2 9 in this country have received discriminatory treatvery identification of a group to discriminate within would constitute discrimination against that group.
Note, Constitutional Limitations on the NaturalizationPower, 80 YALE L.J. 769, 794 (1971)
(emphasis in original). In a footnote, the author points out:
Of course, if a naturalization statute employed classifications which were suspect in
themselves, strict review would automatically be triggered as to those classifications. Certainly race, religion, and national origin are suspect classifications for
naturalization purposes. Unless necessary to a compelling state interest, then, a
statute which denied naturalization on such a basis would be invalid.
Id at 794 n.113.
26. See note 1 supra.
27. Id See also notes 39-59 and accompanying text infra.
28. See notes 60-92 and accompanying text infra.
29. Aliens are defined under the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 91-225,
84 Stat. 116 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976)), as "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." Id. § 1101(a)(3). Aliens are classified either as "resident aliens"
(those admitted to permanent residence, id § 115 1(a)), or "nonimmigrant" (those admitted
for temporary periods such as the students in Narenji, id § 1 ll(a)(15)).
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ment during periods of economic depression and political unrest.3 ° In the

late nineteenth century, as increased industrialization resulted in a scarcity
of available jobs for which citizens had to compete with an ever-growing
number of immigrants, Congress passed exclusionary legislation directed
primarily at the Chinese. 3 Further prohibitions on the immigration of the
Japanese and other groups of Asiatic origin were enforced through the
Gentleman's Agreement of 190732 and the 1914 National Origins Act.33
The Mexican "Repatriation" Campaign of the post-Great Depression
years resulted in the expulsion of over 250,000 United States citizens of
Mexican descent.34 As the nation became more sensitive to the negative
effects of racial and ancestral discrimination in the years following World
War II, this lamentable tradition" of lawfully-sanctioned discrimination
against aliens was diminished.36 The 1965 and 1978 amendments to the
Immigration and Nationality Act3 7 abolished the national origins quota
system and lifted the hemispheric quotas which favored immigration from
38
nations with racial compositions similar to that of most Americans.

Most significantly, during this time the Supreme Court clarified its opposition to racial and ancestral discrimination and greatly altered its treatment

of equal protection cases involving discrimination against aliens.
30. See generally C. GORDON

AND

E. GORDON,

IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW,
GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION, A REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 7-12 (Sept.
1980) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT].

§§ 1.1-1.3 (stud. ed. 1979); THE TARNISHED

31. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882). Similar acts were passed
in 1884 and 1888: ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115 (1884); ch. 1501, 25 Stat. 476 (1888).
32. The Gentleman's Agreement of 1907, United States Department of State, Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1924 (2d ed. 1939), at 339, cited in
CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 30, at 9.
33. Ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924). See CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 30, at 8-10.
34. CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 30, at 10.
35. Among the most shameful and harshest decisions discriminating against aliens were
the Communist Party cases of the McCarthy era. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954);
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)
(upholding the deportation of aliens on the basis of membership in the communist party
absent advocacy of unlawful action).
36. It has become the statutory policy of the United States to bar discrimination on
grounds of national origin in employment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976); public accommodations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976); public education, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1976); public facilities, 42 U.S.C. § 2000b (1976); and federally assisted programs, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980).
37. Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976)); Pub. L.
No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (to be codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
38. See CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 30, at 11-12.
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Discriminationon the Basis of National Origin. Evolution of the
Suspect Class Distinctionand the Strict Scrutiny Standard

Following the enactment of the fourteenth amendment, the Equal Protection Clause was originally interpreted to apply only to negroes as a
class.3 9 Seven years later, however, in Strauder v. West Virginia," the
Supreme Court suggested that the scope of the fourteenth amendment
might encompass other classes identified by racial or ancestral characteristics. Invalidating a state law excluding blacks from juries, the Court questioned, "if a law should be passed excluding all naturalized Celtic
Irishmen, would there be any doubt of its inconsistency with the spirit of
the Amendment?"'" In the 1886 landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,4 2
the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment was extended
to prohibit arbitrary discrimination by the states on the basis of race, color,
or nationality.4 3 Continued antagonism toward the Chinese in the late
nineteenth century spawned a series of cases in which the Supreme Court
repeatedly sustained equal protection challenges made on the basis of
ancestry.44
In The JapaneseRestriction Cases,4 5 the Supreme Court introduced the
"suspect class" distinction into equal protection analysis and established a
heightened standard of review for laws discriminating on the basis of national origin. 46 In Hirabayashiv. United States,4 7 a curfew order applica39. In the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873), the Court said:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever
be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for
that race and that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other.
Id at 81.
40. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
41. Id at 308.
42. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
43. Id at 369. At issue in Yick Wo was a facially neutral San Francisco ordinance
prohibiting the operation of wooden laundries that was enforced exclusively against the Chinese. Yick Wo is considered the seminal case extending equal protection to aliens. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.
228 (1896).
44. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500
(1926); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
45. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943).
46. See note I supra. Ironically, The Japanese Restriction Cases are the only instances
in which the Supreme Court has upheld dejure governmental discrimination against a racial
or ancestral minority under the compelling state interest test. See W. LOCKHART, Y.
KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONsTrruTIONAL LAW, CASES-COMMENTS---QuEsTIONS 1297-98
(4th ed. 1975). Although neither Korematsu nor Birabayashi have been overruled, the hold-
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ble only to Japanese-Americans was upheld as within the executive's
power to wage war.4" The Court recognized that under normal peacetime
conditions "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry
are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality."49 Nevertheless, the Court limited
its inquiry to "whether, in light of all the relevant circumstances preceding
and attending their promulgation, the challenged orders and statute afforded a reasonable basis for the action taken in imposing the curfew." 5
One year later, however, the Court abandoned the rational basis test for
ancestral classifications in Korematsu v. United States.5 Although it sustained the wartime exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from designated West Coast military areas, the Court declared at the outset of its
opinion that:
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which
curtail the rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.
That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It
is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.
Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of
such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.5 2
The exclusion order in Korematsu was constitutional, according to the
Court, only because the war with Japan produced an "apprehension...
of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety,"' 53 justifying otherwise
ings in The JapaneseRestriction Cases have been widely criticized by constitutional scholars.
Professor Lawrence Tribe has commented: "The decision [Korematsu] represents the nefarious impact that war and racism can have on institutional integrity and cultural health." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1000 (1978). See also Dembitz, Racial Dircrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45
COLUM. L. REV. 175 (1945); Freeman, Genesis, Exodus and Leviticus-Geneology, Evacuation
and Law, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 414 (1943). Critics fear that, despite strong language in the
decisions confining the use of nationality classifications to the gravest situations of public
peril, the cases could become precedent for the discriminatory treatment of political minorities. For excellent discussions of The JapaneseRestriction Cases, see Rostow, The Japanese
American Cases-A Disaster,54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945) and the articles cited therein. Rostow
points out the dangerous possibility that The JapaneseRestriction Cases could serve as "precedent which may well be used to encourage attacks on the civil rights of citizens and aliens
and ...give aid to reactionary political programs which use social division and racial
prejudice as tools for conquering power." Id at 491.
47. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
48. Id at 92.
49. Id at 100.
50. Id at 101. The Court concluded that, in this case, it was enough that circumstances
within the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for maintaining the national
defense afforded a rational basis for the decision which they made. Id at 102.
51. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
52. Id at 216.
53. Id at 218. The exclusion order in Korematsu was upheld despite the absence of a
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impermissible ancestral distinctions.
The equal protection analysis set forth in Korematsu for review of national origin classifications was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court during
the post-war years in Oyama v. Calfornia.5 4 Cyama invalidated California's Alien Land Law under which farmlands recorded in the name of the
minor son of a Japanese alien ineligible for naturalization escheated to the
state. Application of the statute deprived the son, a citizen, of treatment
under the law equal to that given children of other nationalities." The
Court found no "compelling justification which would be needed to sustain discrimination of that nature" and emphasized that there were constitutional limits to the means used by the state to enforce its purposes.5 6 In
the subsequent case of Hernandez v. Texas," the fourteenth amendment's
prohibition on national origin discrimination was again invoked when the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional Texas' systematic exclusion of Mexican-Americans from jury service."8 The court noted that "[it]
has been
recognized since Strauder v. West Virginia that the exclusion of a class of
persons from jury service on grounds other than race or color may also
deprive a defendant who is a member of that class of the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws."5' 9
B.

Discriminationon the Basis of Alienage. A Double Standard/orState
andFederalClass'cations

In contrast to the strict standard of review compelled by national origin
discrimination in equal protection analysis, discrimination against aliens
triggers heightened review only when a state classification is involved.'
Federal alienage classifications fall within the shadow of the congressional
plenary power over immigration and are consequently shielded from all
but minimal scrutiny by the courts. 6
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's ruling in Yick Wo v. Hopkins that
showing that any of the Japanese-Americans affected by the order were an actual threat to
national security. See id at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that the
INS regulation at issue in Narenji was premised on the same type of blanket assumption:
that all Iranian students in this country both supported their government's actions in Tehran
and were an actual threat to domestic order. See 481 F. Supp. at 1147.
54. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
55. id at 640.
56. Id
57. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
58. Accord, Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
59. 347 U.S. at 477 (citation omitted).
60. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
61. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795 (1977).
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aliens are "persons" entitled to the protection afforded by the fourteenth
amendment, 62 equal protection challenges to state laws effectively denying
the civil rights of aliens were generally sustained by the courts. 63 An exception to this trend developed in those cases where the state invoked the
"public interest doctrine" as justification for granting citizens priority over
aliens in the enjoyment of public benefits, particularly in the employment
sector.' Essentially, the public interest doctrine permitted the states to
reserve certain benefits for their citizens if those benefits "pertain to the
regulation or distribution of the public domain, or of the common property
or resources of the people of the State ....
The public interest doctrine met its demise in 1971 in the same case in
which the Supreme Court elevated state discrimination against aliens to
suspect status. While scrutinizing an Arizona statute denying welfare benefits to aliens who failed to meet a fifteen-year durational residency requirement, the Court determined in Graham v. Richardson6 6 that because
aliens were a "discrete and insular minority," they were entitled to
"heightened judicial solicitude" when discriminated against by the states.67
The Court thus guaranteed that state classifications based on alienage
would be subject to the strictest standard of review under equal protection
analysis. 61 In subsequent cases, the invalidation of various state restric62. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
63. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926) (de facto discrimination against Chinese merchants in the Philippines for keeping books in Chinese held violative of the equal
protection clause); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (Arizona statute prohibiting employers from hiring more than a specified percentage of aliens invalidated as an unreasonable
interference with a particular group's right to earn a livelihood as protected by the fourteenth amendment).
64. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel Clarke v. Deckebaugh, 274 U.S. 392 (1925) (alien denied license to operate pool hall); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915) (public works projects);
Miller v. City of Niagara Falls, 207 A.D. 798, 202 N.Y.S. 549 (1924) (fear of contamination
justifies prohibition on sale of soda pop by aliens).
65. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. at 39.
66. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
67. Id at 372 (citing United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938)).
68. A loophole in the application of the strict scrutiny (compelling state interest) test to
aliens has limited the potential effect of Graham on state alienage restrictions. Under the
"governmental functions exception," the Supreme Court has recognized that the states have
a right to discriminate on the basis of alienage where such discrimination is necessary "to
preserve the basic conception of a political community." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
344 (1972). Aliens may be excluded from those state positions which involve direct participation in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy or which require the
performance of functions that go to the heart of representative government. Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). Recently, the governmental functions exception has been
expanded to include "functions [that] are so bound up with the operation of the State as a
governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those functions of all persons who have

19811

Equal Protection and National Origin

tions on aliens resulted. For example, prohibitions on aliens in the practice
of law6 9 and the licensed professions" were struck down as well as state
restrictions on aliens in the New York Civil Service System 7 ' and in college loan programs.7 2
Although the suspect status accorded state alienage classifications in
Graham implied that similar federal restrictions on aliens might also violate equal protection principles, the Supreme Court has consistently deferred to the federal government when reviewing federal alienage
classifications, requiring only a rational basis for such restrictions.7 3 Indeed, in immigration cases involving membership in political parties,7"
discrimination against illegitimates,7" and even the rights of American citizens to the free exchange of political views,76 the Court has declined to
review alienage distinctions made by the political branches of the federal
government. This relaxed analysis in federal alienage cases, premised on
both the plenary power doctrine and the foreign affairs power, has prevailed since 1889 when the Supreme Court decided The Chinese Exclusion
Case.77

The continued deference of the Supreme Court to the congressional plenary power over immigration and naturalization is evidenced by several
post-Graham cases involving federal discrimination against aliens. In Mathews v. Diaz, 7' a 1976 case upholding the constitutionality of a federal
statute that denied Medicare benefits to aliens residing in this country for
less than five years, the Court focused on the question of whether "statutory discrimination within the class of aliens--allowing benefits to some
not become part of the process of self-government." Ahmbach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 7374 (1979) (aliens not intending to seek naturalization denied teaching positions in New
York's public school system); accord, Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (denial of employment as a New York State trooper).
69. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
70. Examining Board of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
71. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
72. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
73. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
74. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
75. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
76. Kliendienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
77. 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (upholding the right of Congress to deny reentry to a Chinese
laborer temporarily out of the United States). Although The Chinese Exclusion Case has
long been regarded as one of the foundational cases establishing the congressional plenary
power over matters relating to immigration and naturalization, a strong argument can be
made for the proposition that The Chinese Exclusion Case and related decisions in Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) and United States ex rel Turner v. Williams, 194
U.S. 279 (1904), do not stand for anything more than the right of Congress to deport unlawfull, admitted aliens from the country. See Aliens, Deportation,supra note 10, at 29.
78. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
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aliens but not to others-is permissible."7 9 In Mathews, the Court reaffirmed the plenary power doctrine, emphasizing that minimal interference
by the courts in the relationship between aliens and the federal government was necessary. According to the Court, "[tihe reasons that preclude
judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of
immigration and naturalization." 0 Absent a showing of a "wholly irrational" classification and without identification of a sounder standard
under which to terminate Medicare benefits, the Court would not substitute its judgment for that of Congress." l Previous cases in which the Court
had invalidated federal discrimination under the fifth amendment equal
protection guarantee were distinguished as involving interference with or
loss of a fundamental right.8 2 The Court found that Graham supported
federal preemption in the immigration field, confining that decision's strict
scrutiny standard to cases which involved state discrimination against
aliens.83
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 4 another post-Graham alien discrimination case, involved a constitutional challenge to a Civil Service Commission rule excluding aliens from employment in the federal civil service.
Although the Court acknowledged the existence of a fifth amendment
equal protection issue,8 5 it decided the case on procedural due process
grounds. The Court's narrow inquiry into the procedural sufficiency of the
Civil Service Commission rule at issue in Hampton proceeded from the
premise that, "when the Federal Government asserts an overriding national interest as justification for a discriminatory rule which would violate
the Equal Protection Clause if adopted by a State, due process requires
that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually
intended to serve that interest."8 6 This due process requirement was man79. Id at 80 (emphasis in original).
80. Id at 81-82.

81. Id at 83-84.
82. Id at 85-87 (citing Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (fundamental right to travel) and United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973) (right of association)). The distinction made by the Mathews Court, that equal pro-

tection cases involving a fundamental right are to be decided under a more stringent analysis
than that set out in Mathews, 426 U.S. at 85-87 suggests that alienage classifications based on
suspect criteria would receive the same heightened level of review.
83. 426 U.S. at 84.
84. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
85. Id at 100. The Court noted that "[t]he concept of equal justice under law is served
by the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process, as well as by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id
86. Id at 103.
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dated as well by the fact that alien "ineligibility for employment in a major
sector of the economy" was a deprivation of a liberty interest affecting "a
discrete class of persons. . . on a wholesale basis" who were already disadvantaged compared to the rest of the community. 7 The Civil Service
Commission's bar on alien employment was unconstitutional since it was a
discriminatory rule promulgated by a federal agency with no direct responsibility for fostering the interest that the rule was intended to serve. 88
Although the middle scrutiny standard used by the Court in Hampton was
not premised on the equal protection component of the fifth amendment
but on a procedural due process analysis, the level of review was consistent
with the less-demanding standards implemented by the Court in previous
cases involving equal protection challenges to federal regulation of aliens.
Following Hampton and Mathews, the Supreme Court reviewed a federal statute which discriminated among aliens as a class on the nonsuspect
bases of sex and illegitimacy. In Fiallo v. Bell,89 the Court upheld a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 195290 which denied special preference status to unwed fathers and their illegitimate children. The
Fiallo Court declined to scrutinize the challenged federal legislation in
deference to Congress' plenary power over immigration matters. 9 1 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell noted that in immigration cases involving a facially legitimate exercise of executive power, "the courts will
neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing
its justification . ..."9'
87. Id at 102-03.
88. Id ai 116-17. The Court found that the government interests in the citizenship
requirement-the enhancement of presidential power to negotiate treaties, the supplying of
an incentive for citizenship, and the administrative convenience in screening applicants for
sensitive government positions--to be outside the province of the Civil Service Commission.
The Court noted, "That agency has no responsibility for foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations, for establishing immigration quotas or conditions of entry, or for naturalization policies." Id at 114.
89. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
90. 66 Stat. 182, as amended by 8 U.S.C. §§ Il01(b)(l)(D), 1l101(b)(2) (1976).
91. 430 U.S. at 792. "At the outset, it is important to underscore the limited scope of
judicial inquiry into immigration legislation. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that
'over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is
over' the admission of aliens." Id at 792 (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,
214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
92. 430 U.S. at 794-95 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972)). The
notion that the courts should decline to review such cases originated in Kleindienst where the
Supreme Court upheld the Attorney General's denial of a passport renewal for noted Marxist scholar Ernest Mandel, despite first amendment claims raised by American citizens who
argued that they had been deprived of the exchange of Manders views in the academic
forum.
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C. Summary
The prevailing principles of equal protection dictate a double standard
of review for discriminatory classifications directed against aliens. State
laws or regulations infringing on the rights of aliens can be justified only
upon a showing that the state's interest is compelling9 3 and that the "use of
the classification is 'necessary. . .to the accomplishment' of its purpose or
the safeguarding of its interest."94 Federal discrimination based on alien
status is reviewed less strictly and will be upheld as long as a reasonable
basis for the classification exists,9 5 and, where appropriate, the court may
refrain completely from scrutinizing a federal classification. 96 In contrast,
national origin discrimination is always "suspect" whether the governmental restriction is state or federal, and the strict scrutiny test is applied automatically in the protection of a group's civil rights. Since the respective
standard of review in equal protection cases depends on the basis of the
discrimination involved, identification of that criterion is the threshold issue when an equal protection analysis is initiated.

II. N,4ENJi

v ClvILE7nI: THE ABANDONMENT OF TRADITIONAL
EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES

Curiously, neither the district court nor the court of appeals applied a
strict scrutiny analysis when reviewing the reporting requirement in
Narenji,a facially discriminatory classification which clearly distinguished
Iranian students from the larger class of aliens on the basis of their national origin.
Although the district court identified the constitutional issue as national
origin discrimination and acknowledged that discrimination of this nature
merits strict judicial review,97 the court felt that review under the Hampton

v. Mow Sun Wong standard was appropriate stating:
In instances when the guarantee of equal protection under the
due process clause of the fifth amendment is invoked against a
federal enactment or regulation, a different analysis may be required in that 'there may be overriding national interests which
justify selective federal legislation that would be unacceptable for
93. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971).
94. fnre Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973) (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
196 (1964)).
95. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83 (1976).
96. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770
(1972).
97. 481 F. Supp. 1132, 1138-39.
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an individual State.' 98
The district court's reliance on Hampton was misplaced for two reasons.
First, the legitimate basis standard enunciated in Hampton and applied by
the district court in Narenji was a procedural due process standard inapplicable to an equal protection analysis under the fifth amendment. 99 Second, the language in Hampton discussing equal protection analysis under
the fifth amendment was preceded by an express declaration that the equal
protection guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments "require the
same type of analysis."o Thus, while Hampton clearly states that the
existence of strong federal interests may ustfiy a discriminatory federal
classification, presumably when those interests are evaluated under the appropriate standard of review, the case does not stand for the proposition
that a less rigorous equal protection standard will apply merely because a
discriminatory classification is challenged under the equal protection component of the fifth amendment. A further distinction between Hampton
and Narenji is that the discrimination in Hampton bore neither of the
traditional earmarks of strict scrutiny, in that it affected neither a suspect
class nor a fundamental right.' 0 Instead, the appellees in Hampton were
deprived of an "interest in liberty,"' 1 2 the review of which has never commanded a more exacting standard than intermediate scrutiny.' 0 3 A narrow reading of Hampton further limits its application to a situation where
a discriminatory regulation is promulgated by a federal agency in an area
in which that agency has no responsibility."
In reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit focused on the ability of Congress or the executive
branch to create distinctions in the immigration field based on national
98. Id. at 1144 (citing 426 U.S. 88, 100).
99. See notes 84-88 and accompanying text supra.
100. 426 U.S. at 100. Interestingly enough, the district court in Narenji did observe in a
footnote to its opinion that:
[L]ikewise, if traditional equal protection analysis were applied in this instance, the
same reasons that demonstrate the government's failure to justify its actions as
based on an 'overriding national interest' would show that the interests asserted are
not sufficiently compelling to meet the standard of strict scrutiny required in examining classifications based on national origin.
481 F. Supp. at 1145 n.9.
101. See note I supra.
102. 426 U.S. at 102 (ineligibility for employment in a major sector of the economy).
103. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593 (1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969).
104. 426 U.S. at 114-16.
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origin if such distinctions were premised on a rational basis. 05 The appellate court did not even afford the classification in Nareni the benefit of the
middle scrutiny analysis applied by the district court, but held that "classifications among aliens based upon nationality are consistent with due process and equal protection if supported by a rational basis."' 106 However,
the authorities relied upon by the court to support this proposition involved discrimination among aliens on the basis of other nonsuspect criteria rather than national origin discrimination.
The Court in Saxbe v. Bustos 0 7 upheld the INS practice of exempting
daily and seasonal commuters from Mexico and Canada from certain requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The basis for the differential treatment in Saxbe was the aliens' status as commuters, rather
than their national origin. 08 Similarly, Mathews v. Diazt°9 should not be
interpreted to support congressional or executive authority to make distinctions among aliens solely on the basis of nationality. Although the objects of the discrimination in Mathews were aliens, the basis for the
classification was length of residency. Finally, the court of appeals' reliance on Fiallo v. Bell" is also questionable. The restrictions levied
against aliens in Fiallo "involved 'double-barreled' discrimination based
on sex and illegitimacy""' and were not directed at aliens of any specific
nationality.' 12
105. 617 F.2d 745, 747 (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65 (1974)).
106. 617 F.2d at 748 (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67 (1976)).
107. 419 U.S. 65 (1974).
108. In fact, the petitioners in Saxbe did not even raise an equal protection challenge.
The resolution of the issue in Saxbe focused on the statutory interpretation of
§ 101(a)(27)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by 79 Stat. 916, 8
U.S.C. § 110 1(a)(27)(B) (1976). 419 U.S. at 66.
109. 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (invalidating federal statute denying Medicare benefits to aliens
failing to meet a five-year durational residency requirement). See also notes 78-83 and accompanying text supra.
110. 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (holding constitutional a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act granting special preference immigration status to the legitimate children and
parents of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents). See also notes 89-92 and
accompanying text supra.
i1l. 430 U.S. at 794. Neither sex nor illegitimacy have been afforded suspect treatment
by a full majority of the Supreme Court but rather fall within that sensitive area meriting
intermediate review. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
112. Although the Fiallo opinion reaffirms the plenary power in broad language, it
makes no mention of nationality or other such suspect distinctions.
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THE IMPLICATIONS OF NARENJi

OPENING THE DOOR TO FUTURE

DISCRIMINATION WITHIN THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT

The appellate court's unprecedented holding that the political branches
may make ancestral classifications in the immigration field as long as they
are not wholly irrational is disturbing for several reasons. First, the court
never addressed the suspect nature of the discrimination involved in
Narenji. It apparently concluded that the issue of suspectness and its attendant strict standard of review could be discarded in the face of the congressional plenary power over immigration and the President's authority to
act in the field of foreign affairs. However, the court provided no valid
reason why suspect classifications should be evaluated under a diminished
standard of review in the immigration context. Certainly, the suspect nature of nationality classifications remains unaltered in that context. Ancestry, like race, remains an "immutable characteristic determined solely by
the accident of birth,""' 3 and ancestral discrimination directed at aliens
cannot be eliminated through the political efforts of the class itself since
aliens do not enjoy the right to vote. Since the Supreme Court has never
invalidated discrimination of a suspect nature without applying a strict
standard of review even during times of war, it is clearly unprecedented to
apply a lesser standard to such classifications in peacetime. Having failed
the middle scrutiny test applied by the district court, the governmental interests proffered to justify the discrimination in Narenji would certainly
not be sustained under strict scrutiny. However, application of the proper
standard would at least insure that the government make the usual showing of a compelling state interest and a means necessary to the accomplishment of such an interest.
Continued deference to the plenary power merely avoids the issue of
whether the executive branch or the Congress can shield otherwise impermissible classifications from the usual constitutional safeguards under the
guise of national security and foreign affairs."' Since the days of Marbury
v. Madison,"' it has been clear that even the plenary power cannot authorize either of the popular branches to act outside the perimeters of the
113. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
114. Tenuous national security rationales proffered under the President's power to regu-

late foreign affairs were rejected in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952) (presidential seizure of the nation's steel mills during the Korean conflict held unconstitutional as exceeding the authority of the executive) and New York Times v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (PentagonPapers Case) (executive effort to enjoin publication of

secret documents related to the Vietnam war subject to first amendment prohibition on prior
restraints).
115. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Constitution" 16 or eliminate the duty of the Supreme Court to evaluate the
constitutionality of those standards. Further reliance on unfettered congressional powers in the area of immigration contradicts both the constitutional model of the balance of powers and the doctrine of fifth amendment
substantive due process which limits all congressional power including the
war powers.17

Perhaps the most disturbing implication of the Narenji decision is the
court's failure to remember the lesson of The JapaneseRestriction Cases,

despite three decades of increased public awareness of the harm of racial
and ethnic intolerance. As Narenji illustrates, national origin is a characteristic readily seized upon in the heat of national crises for the creation of
political scapegoats. Equally disturbing is the refusal of the courts to subject the INS regulation to the traditional constitutional hurdles. As Justice
Jackson warned thirty-six years ago in his dissent in Korematsu v. United
States, a governmental distinction made on the basis of race or ancestry, if
sanctioned by the courts, will "lie about like a loaded weapon ready for the
hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need."" 8
IV.

CONCLUSION

Narenji v. Civiletti suggests that the existing constitutional protections
which safeguard the rights of ancestral minorities can be suspended if such
actions are taken in the closely related areas of immigration and foreign
affairs. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit may serve as precedent within the immigration context for limited judicial review of other suspect classifications such as race
116. See Almeida v. Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) where the Supreme Court noted
within the immigration context that "[it is clear, of course, that no Act of Congress can
authorize a violation of the Constitution." The words of Justice Gray in Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), point to the conclusion that, even when articulating the
basic premises of the plenary power theory, the Supreme Court still felt that the congressional power over immigration and naturalization was subject to constitutional limits:
The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting international relations, is vested in the political departments of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority
according to the regulations so established, except so far as the judicial department
has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is requiredby theparamount law of
the Constitution, to intervene.

149 U.S. at 713 (1893) (emphasis added).
117. See Aliens, Deportation, supra note 10 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957);

Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251
U.S. 146 (1919)).
118. 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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which presently command a strict scrutiny analysis when subjected to an
equal protection challenge. Further reliance upon the plenary power doctrine to permit the circumvention of established constitutional standards of
review revives the long-discarded notion that certain actions of the government lie outside the Constitution.
Mary McGowan

